approximations to the set of values that the objects of a program may assume during its execution. We present an analysis for the -calculus that shows how names will be bound to actual channels at run time. The result of our analysis establishes a super-set of the set of channels to which a given name may be bound and of the set of channels that may be sent along a given channel. Besides a set of rules that permit to validate a given solution, we also o er a constructive procedure that builds solutions in low polynomial time.
Introduction
Program analysis aims at verifying properties of a program that hold in all executions { regardless of the actual data upon which the program operates and regardless of the speci c environment in which it executes. Traditionally, program analysis has been used in compilers for \optimizing" the implementation of programming languages. More recently, program analysis has been used for validating security and safety issues for concurrent and distributed systems.
Program analysis provides automatic and decidable methods for analysing properties of programs. Since most properties implicitly involve questions about termination, the methods are intended to \err on the safe side". For each analysis an ordering is imposed on the properties, for example stipulating that a property is larger than another if more values satisfy the former than the latter. The properties are then interpreted in such a way that an analysis remains correct even when it produces a larger property than ideally possible. This corresponds to producing a valid inference in a program logic for partial correctness. However, program analysis is generally more e cient than program veri cation, and for that reason more approximate, because the focus is on the fully automatic processing of large programs.
We wish to study these issues for concurrent languages. To investigate them in a pure form we shall use the -calculus which is a model of concurrent communicating processes based on name passing. Names may represent both data and channels that processes exchange. For example, if a is the name of a link to some information on the web home page of a user, then another user can access this information through a, by performing a communication. We propose in Section 3 a Control Flow Analysis for the -calculus that only requires minor additions to the syntax: assigning explicit \channels" to the names occurring in restrictions and assigning explicit \binders" to the names occurring in input pre xes. This may be compared to the approach of 40] where processes are required to be on a special form. Roughly, channels can be seen as representatives of semantic values that names may have, and binders as the actual placeholders in input pre xes. We review in Section 2 the syntax and the early semantics of the -calculus, and we introduce our annotations.
The result of our Control Flow Analysis establishes a super-set of the set of channels to which a given name may be bound and of the set of channels that may be sent along a given channel. These super-sets give rise to solutions ( ; ) and we formulate the Control Flow Analysis as a speci cation of the correctness of a candidate solution. This takes the form of a Flow Logic with judgements ( ; ) j = me P (where me is an auxiliary function that associates channels or binders with the free names of the process P), and a set of clauses that operate on them. We show that best solutions always exist and we establish the semantic correctness of solutions in the form of a subject-reduction result. In Section 4 we then present a procedure that generates solutions by inducing on the structure of processes, and operates in O(N 5 ) time with respect to the size N of the process under analysis.
We apply our analysis for statically checking two simple security properties. The rst property is in Section 5, and considers channels as divided into \secret" and \public" ones. Then, the dynamic security requirement is that secret information may only be communicated over secret channels; in other words a process has no leaks of secret information. With simple checks on a solution, we obtain a static test (called con nement) for a given process having no leaks, and we prove it safe with respect to the dynamic notion (called no leaks).
The second property presented in Section 6 is the simple security property that is part of the multi-level security property (\no read-up/no write-down") of Bell and LaPadula 5] . Processes are given levels of security clearance, and the dynamic property demands that those at high level never send information to those at low level, while communications in any other direction is permitted. A little extension to our machinery is su cient to de ne a static check (called discreetness) for when a process respects the classi cation hierarchy, and to prove it safe with respect to the dynamic notion (called nru/nwd).
Finally, we brie y discuss in Section 7 some related work on static analysis and security properties and in Section 8 some other uses of Control Flow Analysis for concurrent processes. 2 The -calculus Syntax. In this section we brie y recall the -calculus 29], a model of concurrent communicating processes based on the notion of name passing.
De nition 2.1 Let N be an in nite set of names ranged over by a; b; ; x; y; and let be a distinguished element such that N \f g = ;. Processes are built from names according to the syntax P ::= 0 j :P j P + P j PjP j ( x)P j x = y]P j !P where may either be x(y) for input, or xy for output or for silent moves.
Hereafter, the trailing 0 will be omitted (i.e. we write instead of :0).
We assume that + has lower precedence than j which again has lower precedence than the other operators.
The pre x is the rst atomic action that the process :P can perform. The input pre x x(y) binds the name y in the pre xed process. Intuitively, some name y is received along the link named x. The output pre x xy does not bind the name y which is sent along x. The silent pre x denotes an action which is invisible to an external observer of the system. Summation denotes non-deterministic choice, so P +Q behaves either as P or as Q. The operator j describes parallel composition of processes. Intuitively, P and Q in PjQ act independently and can also communicate when one performs an input and the other an output on the same common link. The restriction operator ( x)P acts as a declaration for the name x in the process P that it pre xes. In other words, x is a unique name in P which is di erent from all the external names. The agent ( x)P behaves as P except that sending and receiving along x and x is blocked. A distinguished feature of the -calculus is to allow for an enlargement of the scope of a restriction; we will expand on this below. Matching x = y]P is an if-then operator: process P is activated if x = y. Finally, replication !P behaves as PjPj as many times as needed.
The formulation of our analysis only requires a minor extension to the syntax of the -calculus, namely annotating the binding occurrences of names within restrictions with \channels" , and the binding occurrences of names within input pre xes with \binders" . These syntactic extensions are needed because of the -conversion allowed by the structural congruence. They do not a ect the dynamic semantics of the -calculus; however, they heavily in uence the way in which our static analysis of Section 3 operates. From the point of view of the analysis, annotations place all the names of a process in a nite set of equivalence classes. Through them, the analysis computes (a super-set of) the actual links that a name can denote.
De nition 2.2 Let B be a non-empty set of binders ranged over by ; 0 ; ; and let C be a non-empty set of channels ranged over by ; 0 ; such that B\C = ;; moreover call B C the set of markers. Then (annotated) processes, denoted by P; P 1 ; P 2 ; Q; R; 2 Proc are built as in Def. 2.1, where the (annotated) input pre x x(y ) replaces x(y) and the (annotated) restriction ( x )P replaces ( x)P.
Semantics. The -calculus can be equipped with an early as well as a late semantics; in this paper we consider the early operational semantics de ned in SOS style, because it is emerging as a standard for transitional semantics and appears to be more suitable for the security issues studied in the next sections. We follow 30], in particular for the distinction between free and bound input.
The labels of transitions are for silent actions, xy for free input, xy for free output, x(y ) for bound input and x(y ) for bound output. Roughly speaking, the e ect of a bound output is moving a ( x ) operator from a process to a label, as in Q = ( y )xy:P x(y ) ?! P. The intuition behind this operation is to make the name y, which is private to Q, available to the external environment. The bound output then enlarges the scope of the declaration, and for this reason it is sometimes referred to as scope extrusion in the literature. When coupled with a bound input x(y ), the extrusion originates a communication and re-establishes the removed restriction.
As usual, we will use as a metavariable for the labels of transitions (although it is formally distinct from the metavariable for pre xes with which it has a few cases in common). We recall the notion of free names fn( ), bound names bn( ), and names n( ) = fn( ) bn( ) of a label . The subject of an input or output action is the channel (x) used for the communication and the object is the entity (y) being transmitted.
Kind fn( ) bn( ) Silent move ; ;
Free input and output xy; xy fx; yg ; Bound input and output x(y ); x(y ) fxg fyg Functions fn and n are extended in the obvious way to processes.
Congruence. Below we shall need the structural congruence on processes, de ned as in 30] to be the least congruence satisfying:
if P and Q are -equivalent (P = Q) then P Q; to be more precise:
( x )P ( y )(Pfy=xg) if y 6 2 fn(( x )P), and x(y )P x(z )(Pfz=yg) if z 6 2 fn(x(y )P); (Proc= ; +; 0) and (Proc= ; j; 0) are commutative monoids; )( x )P, if x 6 = y, ( x )(P 1 jP 2 ) ( x )P 1 jP 2 if x 6 2 fn(P 2 ), and ( x )P P if x 6 2 fn(P ); !P Pj!P. Note that -conversions do not a ect markers. Also, we permit to exchange restrictions only when the restricted names are di erent, because otherwise ( x )P ( x 0 )P and the marker then loses its identity. Table 1 shows the (annotated) early transition system of the -calculus de ned in SOS style.
A di erent treatment of matching is presented in 7] . There, the structural congruence law x = x]P P is assumed and the transitional rule Match is removed from Tab. 1. This latter change requires an accurate handling of free names, otherwise applying the congruence rule from right to left may introduce new free names ad libitum. The need of handling similar kinds of low level details is a recurrent problem in congruence-based semantics, and in 7] we illustrate one of the techniques needed to deal with them.
We conclude this section with a straightforward fact that will be repeatedly used in the proofs later on. (2) If = xy then fn(P ) fx; yg fn(Q). (3) If = x(y ); xy; x(y ) then fn(P ) fxg (fn(Q) n fyg).
Control Flow Analysis
The result of analysing a process P is a pair ( ; ). The rst component, , is an abstract environment which gives information about the set of channels to which names can be bound; the second component, , is an abstract channel environment which gives information about the set of channels that can ow over given channels.
One way to view the pair ( ; ) is as a record of the actual communications taking place during execution. Whenever a value a val is output on some channel b chan , as in b chan a val , it must be duly recorded in the component, We now make this more precise (also paying attention to an additional marker environment me for associating names with markers).
Validation
To validate the correctness of a proposed solution ( ; ) we state a set of clauses operating upon judgments of the form:
( ; ) j = me P
The purpose of me, and is clari ed by:
me : N ! (B C) is the marker environment that maps a name (in particular the free names of a process) to the appropriate channel or binder used when the name was introduced; so me(x) will be the marker (in B or C) where the current name x is bound. : B ! }(C) is the abstract environment that maps a binder to the set of channels that it can be bound to; more precisely, ( ) must include the set of channels that could evaluate to. We shall allow to regard the abstract environment as a function : (B C) ! }(C) by setting 8 2 C : ( ) = f g. We write ? for the function that maps everything to ;. However, we continue to assume that 8 2 C : ?( ) = f g. : C ! }(C) is the abstract channel environment that maps a channel to the set of channels that can be communicated over it; more precisely, ( ) must include the set of channels that can be communicated over the channel .
Also here we write ? for the function that maps everything to ;.
Note that we use a marker environment, because the identity of names is not preserved under -conversions (see the rule Var). Indeed, it would not su ce to \ -rename the program apart" because this property is not preserved under reduction, in particular when scope extrusion is required. A further comment on annotations may clarify their subsequent use. A typical schema for annotating the occurrences of restricted names and of objects of inputs in a process P is to keep all the 's and the 's distinct; also, the marker environment me should map the free names of P to fresh channels. Note that annotating a process in this way is merely mechanical and involves no knowledge about its behaviour.
The 2 (me(x)) : ( ) ( ) ( ; ) j = me P 1 + P 2 i ( ; ) j = me P 1^( ; ) j = me P 2 ( ; ) j = me P 1 jP 2 i ( ; ) j = me P 1^( ; ) j = me P 2 ( ; ) j = me ( x )P i ( ; ) j = me x7 ! ] P ( ; ) j = me x = y]P i ( (me(x)) \ (me(y)) 6 = ; ) ( ; ) j = me P ( ; ) j = me !P i ( ; ) j = me P matching. Moreover, the second conjunct of the rule for output requires that the set of channels that can be communicated along each element of (me(x)) includes the channels to which y can evaluate. Symmetrically, the rule for input demands that the set of channels that can pass along x is included in the set of channels to which y can evaluate. In the clause for restriction, we can simply update the marker environment as me x 7 ! ] because ( ) = f g by de nition. The condition for matching says that the continuation P needs to be validated if there is at least one channel to which both x and y can evaluate. A simple check shows that ( ; ) j = me P. The objects x of the inputs on channels a and d are kept distinct for the analysis, because the annotations 0 and 3 place them in two di erent equivalence classes (but this does not in uence the dynamic semantics). The reader may have noticed that ( ; ) above is not the least solution, e.g. because of the presence of 4 . This kind of useless channels may occur in solutions, although they do appear neither in annotations nor in the image of a marker environment { nor will they occur in the solutions constructed according to Section 4 (see also Theorem 3.4).
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The formulation of our Control Flow Analysis borrows from standard ideas for functional languages. Our current formulation is insensitive to ow and context 31], so terms can be re-arranged without a ecting the acceptability of a candidate solution; in e ect, restrictions can be lifted to the top-level, or to the nearest enclosing !, and pre xing of actions can be replaced by their parallel composition. While more complex ow analyses can be devised, these are not necessary for the applications to security studied here. Proof. We proceed by structural induction on P (since Tab. 2 is de ned by structural induction on P). Let J f( ; ) j ( ; ) j = me P^( ; ) w ( ; )g and let J and ( j ; j ) be given such that J = f( j ; j ) j j 2 Jg. Next de ne We state now some auxiliary results that will allow us to establish the semantic correctness of our analysis; they are all independent of the operational semantics and only rely on Tab. 2.
Lemma 3.5 Assume that 8x 2 fn(P ) : me 1 (x) = me 2 (x); then ( ; ) j = me 1 P if and only if ( ; ) j = me 2 P.
Proof. A straightforward structural induction on P. 2 Lemma 3.6 Assume that me(y) = me(z); then ( ; ) j = me P if and only if ( ; ) j = me Pfz=yg.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the size of P. Most cases are straightforward using the fact that 8x : me(x) = me(xfz=yg). This leaves us with the cases where the marker environment is modi ed and here we consider only a typical case.
The case P = u(v ):Q. If v = y the result follows from the above remarks so assume that v 6 = y. Let Lemma 3.8 Assume that P Q; then ( ; ) j = me P i ( ; ) j = me Q.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the construction of P Q and here we only consider the two harder cases.
The case of -equivalence. Consider the subcase ( x )P ( y )(Pfy=xg) where y 6 2 fn(( x )P). We calculate that ( ; ) j = me ( x )P is equivalent to ( ; ) j = me x7 ! ] P which by Corollary 3.7 is equivalent to ( ; ) j = me y7 ! ] Pfy=xg (since either y 6 2 fn(P) or y = x) which is equivalent to ( ; ) j = me ( y )(Pfy=xg)
as was to be shown. The other subcase is similar.
The cases ( x )(P 1 jP 2 ) ( x )P 1 jP 2 (if x 6 2 fn(P 2 )) and ( x )P P (if x 6 2 fn(P)) are easy consequences of Lemma 3.5 and the case ( x )( y 0 )P ( y 0 )( x )P (if x 6 = y) is straightforward. 2 Lemma 3.9 Assume that ( ; ) j = me P and me(w) 2 (me(z)); then ( ; ) j = me Pfw=zg.
Proof. The proof is by structural induction on P. Most cases are straightforward using the following fact:
Here we only consider the two harder cases.
The case P = u(v ):Q. By Lemma 3.8 (since -equivalence is part of the structural congruence) we may without loss of generality assume that v is neither w nor z. Then The case P = x = y]Q. Our assumption ( ; ) j = me P amounts to and our goal is to show (me(xfw=zg)) \ (me(yfw=zg)) 6 = ; ) ( ; ) j = me Qfw=zg as this amounts to ( ; ) j = me Pfw=zg. By the induction hypothesis it su ces to show that (me(xfw=zg)) \ (me(yfw=zg)) 6 = ; ) (me(x)) \ (me(y)) 6 = ; that is immediate using the fact stated at the beginning of the proof.
Subject reduction. To establish the semantic correctness of our analysis we rely on the de nition of the early semantics in Tab. 1 as well as on the analysis in Tab. 2. The subject reduction result below applies to all the solutions of the analysis, and hence in particular to the least. The operational semantics only rewrites processes at \top level" where it is natural to demand that all free names are bound to channels (rather than to binders); this is formalised by the condition me fn(?)] C. In the statement below, we write ( ; ) j = Proof. The proof is by induction on the construction of P ?! Q and with subcases depending on whether case (1) , (2a), (2b), (3a) or (3b) applies. Throughout assume that me fn(P)] C, ( ; ) j = me P (i.e. ( ; ) j = C me P ) and P ?! Q. The case (1 The case of rule Com is similar but uses the induction hypotheses (2a) and (3a).
The case (2a). That me fn(Q)] C is immediate from Fact 2.3; furthermore (me(x)) = fme(x)g C and (me(y)) = fme(y)g C. It remains to show that ( ; ) j = me Q and that me(y) 2 (me(x)). In the case of Out it follows from Table 2 that ( ; ) j = me Q and 8 2 (me(x)) : (me(y)) ( ) which amounts to me(y) 2 (me(x)); the axioms Tau The case (3a). Here we also assume that me(y) 2 (me(x)) so that me(y) 2 C. Then me fn(Q)] C is immediate from Fact 2.3 that also implies (me(x)) = fme(x)g C; it remains to show that ( ; ) j = me Q.
In The case (3b). Here we also assume that 2 (me(x)) C. From Fact 2.3 we have (me y 7 ! ]) fn(Q)] C and (me(x)) = fme(x)g C so that it remains to show that ( ; ) j = me y7 ! ] Q.
The axiom BoundIn applies in this case so P has the form x(y ):Q. Let now w 6 2 fyg fn(Q) and note that x(w ):R x(y ):Q for R = Qfw=yg. Since The inclusions occurring in the above items mildly constrain the environment where the process under validation operates. If one only considers closed systems, which can only perform moves, the inclusions become useless, as all names are bound; in essence we retain only item (1).
Construction of Solutions
There is also a constructive procedure for obtaining the least solution which operates in O(N 5 ) time in the size of processes (see 18, 31] ). To describe it we shall concentrate on a process, P ? , of interest as well as a marker environment, me ? , giving the binders and channels of free names in the process. To obtain a nite algorithm we shall prefer to restrict our attention to a nite universe, U ? , containing all the relevant binders and channels and the set me fn(P ? )] = def fme(x) j x 2 fn(P ? )g. We shall say that the size, N, of P ? is the maximum of the number of symbols in P ? and the number of elements in U ? . In case we take an annotation which has all markers di erent from each other and disjoint from the image of the marker environment, N linearly depends on the size of P ? , only. Table 3 : Constraint generation for the -calculus.
Validating a solution ( ; ) j = me P amounts to checking a number of individual constraints. We now de ne a function G C P] ] me for explicitly extracting the set of constraints to be checked. In doing so we shall make it clear that we are extracting the constraints in the form of syntax, and hence replace of Tab. 2 by r and by k.
De nition 4.1 We now de ne two classes of constraints.
An individual constraint is on one of the forms n 1 n 2 , f g n 0 , or n 1 \ n 2 6 = ;, where each n i will be on one of the three forms r( ), r( ) or k( ).
A composite constraint is on the form fic 1 ; ; ic m g ) ic where m 0, all ic i (on the left-hand side) are individual constraints on either form f g n 0 or n 1 \n 2 6 = ;, and ic (on the right-hand side) is an individual constraint on the form n 1 r( ) or n 1 k( ).
The details of G C P] ] me are given in Tab. 3. In the clause for x = y]P we cannot decide whether or not r(me(x)) \ r(me(y)) 6 = ; and hence we ensure that the constraints subsequently generated will in fact explicitly test this. Technically, this is achieved by means of the subscript C to the function G C P] ] me : each constraint generated will be conditional on all of the constraints in the (initially empty) set C. Similarly, in the clauses for xy:P and x(y ):P we use the assumptions about the universe U ? , in particular that me fn(P ? )] U ? , to generate a su ciently large set of constraints that then explicitly test for f g r(me(x)).
The The case x(y ):P. We have that ( ; ) SAT G C x(y ):P] ] me is equivalent to ( ; ) SAT 
Using the induction hypothesis this is equivalent to (( ; ) SAT C) ) ( ; ) j = me y7 ! ] P (( ; ) SAT C) ) (8 2 U ? \ C : 2 (me(x)) ) ( ) ( )) and given the assumptions about the universe U ? this is equivalent to the desired (( ; ) SAT C) ) ( ; ) j = me x(y ):P.
The case x = y]P. We have that ( ; ) SAT G C x = y]P] ] me is equivalent to ( ; ) SAT G C fr(me(x))\r(me(y))6 =;g P] ] me Using the induction hypothesis and the de nition of SAT this is equivalent to (( ; ) SATC^( ; ) sat(r(me(x)) \ r(me(y)) 6 = ;)) ) (( ; ) j = me P) which using the de nition of sat may be rewritten as ( ; ) SATC^( (me(x)) \ (me(y)) 6 = ;)) ) (( ; ) j = me P ) that is equivalent to the desired (( ; ) SAT C) ) ( ; ) j = me x = y]P. The relationship between the two functions, f C andf C , and satisfaction, SAT C, of the set of constraints is given by the following result. Lemma 4.6 ( ; ) SAT C i f C ( ; ) v ( ; ) i f C ( ; ) = ( ; ) whenever C is a set of composite constraints.
Proof. The second \i " is immediate so consider the rst. A composite constraint in C has the form fic 1 ; ; ic m g ) n 1 n 2 ; there are two possibilities for n 2 and here we just consider the case where n 2 is r( 
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To prepare for the iteration we need the following standard result.
Lemma 4.7 f C is monotone andf C is monotone and extensive whenever C is a set of composite constraints. Setting C = G ; P ? ] ] me? it now follows that the least ( ; ) (above a given ( ; ), typically (?; ?)) that satis es ( ; ) j = me? P ? equals the least xed point off C (above ( ; )). Because of our assumptions about the universe, U ? , the set C is nite andf C operates over a complete lattice of nite size.
Standard xed point theory then ensures that the desired ( ; ) is obtained aŝ f j C ( ; ) upon stabilisation, i.e. for the least j such thatf j C ( ; ) =f j+1 C ( ; ) where it is certain that such j exists. We may summarise the development as follows. To see that j cannot always be taken to be 0 consider the two processes P 1 = x(y 24 
Preventing Leakage
A common approach to system security is based on putting objects and subjects into security classes. We demonstrate that Control Flow Analysis helps in statically detecting useful information on security. We consider in this section a static property ensuring that a channel, devised to be secret to a process P, is never communicated to an external user. In the next section we statically check another property that concerns how information ows between processes at di erent levels.
The -calculus does not distinguish between data, that may be secret, and channels that can be seen as capabilities of accessing data. More re ned calculi, notably the spi-calculus 3], make such a distinction and permit a ner description of security properties. We choose here a pure calculus of computations, without encryption and decryption primitives, in order to concentrate on the applicability of the Control Flow Analysis to security issues. In fact, the scoping rules of the -calculus are su cient for a careful use of channels, because processes can generate and pass new names, making the channels they denote available for communication. In a sense, learning the name of a channel amounts to possessing the capability to communicate on it, and restriction governs the visibility of names.
A process P could have the security requirement of keeping secret (some of) its channels, i.e. not to communicate them to the external environment. A process matches this requirement if it never performs an extrusion of a secret channel, as made precise below. In the following, we assume that S is a set of secret channels given by a designated authority, e.g. the designer or the user of a process P, who implicitly introduces also the set P of public channels as the complement of S. A priori, binders are neither public nor secret; the actual solution of the analysis establishes which kind of channels can be bound to each binder.
De nition 5.1 The pair P; me is admissible for the set S C of secret channels, if and only if me fn(P )] C and me fn(P )] \ S = ;: Then, the set of public channels is P = C n S: Note that the condition of admissibility is equivalent to me fn(P )] P, i.e. all free names are public channels.
A dynamic notion. Now, we would like to characterize a process P that never discloses its secrets. We describe this property by saying that P has no leaks. Intuitively, P enjoys this property if neither it nor any of its derivatives can perform an extrusion of a name bound to a secret channel. For this to make sense it is important to assume that the environment (or an external user) cannot guess any secret channels. We formalise this by a constrained notion of computation called censored. Essentially, a computation is censored if no name y, with me(y) 2 S, can be read from the environment through an input.
De nition 5.2 Given P; me; S a censored step (P; me) 7 ?! (Q; me 0 ) is dened whenever the following conditions hold: ) is made of censored steps, whose labels are all immaterial, apart from the last one.
The following proposition shows that admissibility is preserved under censored computations, provided that there is no extrusion of a name marked secret. It also reveals the rôle played by the second condition of a censored step. We are ready to de ne our dynamic notion of security for some P; me that are admissible for the set S of secret channels.
De nition 5. A static notion. The notion of no leaks above is dynamic. We now introduce a static notion, in order to predict at compile time if a process has no leaks. It is called con nement 1 and we prove that it is a su cient condition for a process to have no leaks.
De nition 5.5 Let P; me be admissible for a given S. A process P is conned with respect to S; me if and only if there exists ( ; ) such that (a) ( ; ) j = me P and (b) ( ) = P if 2 P
Hereafter, we will say that P is con ned via the con ning solution ( ; ).
Note that if a process P is con ned, by admissibility we also have that me fn(P )] P. Intuitively, condition (b) above implies that only public information can be transmitted along a public channel, i.e. conversely, any channel, be it secret or public, can pass along secret channels, as no restriction is put on them. We now show that con nement is preserved by censored computations.
Lemma 5.6 (Subject reduction for con nement) Let P be con ned (w.r.t. S; me) and (P; me) 7 ?! (Q; me 0 ); then Q is con ned We are nally ready to show that con nement is su cient to guarantee that P has no leaks.
Theorem 5.7 If P is con ned (with respect to S; me) then P has no leaks (with respect to S; me).
Proof. By Lemma 5.6 it is enough to prove that (P; me)
x(y ) 7 ?! (Q; me 0 ) implies 2 P. Since x 2 fn(P) by Fact 2.3, we have that me(x) 2 P and (me(x)) = P (by con nement). By Theorem 3.10, 2 (me(x)) and hence 2 P as was to be shown.
Example 5.8 We consider here an abstract version of the Wide Mouthed
Frog protocol, adapted from 3]. Intuitively, two principals A and B wish to communicate by classical shared-key cryptography, and the rst forwards a secret key, say c AB , to the second one, with the help of a server. The server shares the secret keys c AS and c SB with A and B, respectively. So, the principal A passes its key c AB , encrypted with c AS , to the server. The server decrypts the message, encrypts it with c SB and passes it to B. Afterwards A sends the message M, encrypted with c AB , to B.
Here principals will be represented by processes and keys by secret channels, because the -calculus has no cryptographic primitives. The speci ca- 
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It is immediate to see that con nement is not a necessary condition for P having no leaks. For instance the process ( x )xy:yx has no leaks but it is not con ned with respect to S = f g and me(y) 6 = . Indeed not all deadlocks can be detected statically. So the extrusion of the name x along channel y is considered a possible violation of secrecy.
Checking the static condition. One approach to checking con nement of a process P with respect to S; me is to use the polynomial time algorithm devised in the previous section. First we check that P; me (or P ? ; me ? ) is indeed admissible for the S given. Next we construct sets of constraints C a and C b corresponding closely to the two conditions in Def. 5.5. For C a we may simply use G ; P] ] me . For C b we generate constraints for half of the equality, namely for the inclusion \ ". To be speci c, write P ? = P \ U ? and let C b consist of the constraints P ? k( ) for all 2 P ? . (These constraints can be expanded into a form allowed by Def. 4.1 unlike what would be the case if we let C b take care of the entire equality.) We then solve the set of constraints in polynomial time so as to get the least solution. Then P is con ned if and only if the least solution has a component equal to the one displayed in Def. 5.5. This approach to determining whether or not P is con ned (w.r.t. to S; me) clearly operates in polynomial time.
6 Multi-level Security
Another way of enforcing security is by de ning a hierarchy of levels for processes. The security requirement is that a process classi ed at a high level cannot write any value to a process at low level, while the converse is allowed; symmetrically a process at low level cannot read data from one of a high level. Sometimes this non-interference property is referred to as no readup/no write-down 16]. These requirements amount to the simple security property that is part of the multi-level access control policy of 5, 14] .
To study the no read-up/no write-down property we need an extension to the syntax of the -calculus to assign security levels to processes. Accordingly, the operational semantics requires a little extension. Moreover, we will adapt the static analysis as well, to take care of these levels.
In the following we will only introduce the necessary extensions to the setting of the previous sections.
Syntax. In order to simplify our presentation, we make here two assumptions, that are common in the literature (see e.g. 42]). First we consider only two levels of security clearance: L for low and H for high. So, we introduce the set L = fL; Hg. The case with a hierarchy of levels is studied in 8].
Secondly, we assume to have systems made of processes in parallel, and only these top-level components are labelled by clearance levels.
The new syntax, de ned below, imports the one in Def. 2.2 for processes.
De nition 6. Table 4 : Early transition system for the -calculus with security levels.
The analysis in Tab. 5 extends the one in Tab. 2, to deal with the levels of security clearance, by imposing two further conditions while checking an input and an output pre x. The channels that can be bound to the object of an input (resp. an output) action along channel must be included in in (l)( ) (resp. out (l)( )), where l is the current security level. This is determined by, and is the only task of the clause for the analysis of the system hPi l . The rules for the other systems are just as the rules for the ( ) in (l)( ) ( ; ; ) j = l me P 1 + P 2 i ( ; ; ) j = l me P 1^( ; ; ) j = l me P 2 ( ; ; ) j = l me P 1 jP 2 i ( ; ; ) j = l me P 1^( ; ; ) j = l me P 2 ( ; ; ) j = l me ( x )P i ( ; ; ) j = l me x7 ! ] P ( ; ; ) j = l me x = y]P i ( (me(x)) \ (me(y)) 6 = ; ) ( ; ; ) j = l me P ( ; ; ) j = l me !P i ( ; ; ) j = l me P ( ; ; ) j = me hPi l i ( ; ; ) j = l me P ( ; ; ) j = me ( x )S i ( ; ; ) j = me x7 ! ] S ( ; ; ) j = me S 1 jS 2 i ( ; ; ) j = me S 1^( ; ; ) j = me S 2 ( ; ; ) j = me !S i ( ; ; ) j = me S 
out (H)( c ) = ;
Recall that ( ) = f g. A simple check shows that ( ; ; ) j = me S.
The semantic soundness of our new analysis is stated by the new subject reduction theorem, which is almost identical to Theorem 3.10. The only differences are the new judgements ( ; ; ) j = me S and the obvious conditions about the new components and l. Its proof is a straightforward adaptation of the one of Theorem 3.10, so we omit it. We also omit the easy extensions of the relevant lemmata in Section 3. As before, ( ; ; ) j = A dynamic notion. We now introduce the dynamic version of the no read-up/no write-down property. As we did with censored steps, we impose a restriction on the channels that can be read by a process P with a given clearance l. We assume that the environment is always willing to listen to P, but it can select which information is to be transmitted to P. To A static notion. We de ne now a static property that guarantees that a process is nru/nwd. Besides nding a solution ( ; ; ) for a process P, we require that the channels that can pass along a given channel include those that can be read and sent along , recorded by the abstract communication structure (condition 2 (a) below). More interesting is item (b) of the same condition, where the channels read along should include those that the environment is willing to supply, expressed by &. The last condition is the key one. It requires that a channel cannot be used for sending an object from a process with high level H to a process with low level L.
De nition 6.6 Let S; me be such that me fn(S)] C. Then S is discreet This contradicts item 3 of Def. 6.6, that demands the intersection of the two sets to be empty.
Example 6.9 It is easy to prove that the process S validated in Example 6.2 is discreet. In particular the following two conditions hold. As was the case for con nement, the polynomial time algorithm of Section 4 can be used to perform a polynomial time check of whether or not a process P is discreet with respect to given &; me.
Related Work
There are two strains of related work: the rst concerns static analysis techniques, the second (mainly) their applications to security.
Static analysis of programs aims at developing e cient techniques that may be used to obtain approximate answers about how a program executes without actually executing it. Traditionally this has been a main component in the construction of e cient implementations of programming languages. There is a vast literature on static program analysis and we here survey some of the more important approaches; we refer to 31] for further details.
Control Flow Analysis (e.g. 39]) deals with the problem of dynamic dispatch where it is not apparent which function (or method) is actually being invoked and where an analysis is needed in order to determine this information. This is a problem that appears all the time in higher-order functional languages and many developments of Control Flow Analysis have indeed been performed for functional languages, but also object-oriented languages 34] and languages with concurrency 18] can be addressed.
Recently, Venet 40, 41] has used Abstract Interpretation 11] to analyse processes in a fragment of the -calculus, with particular attention to the usage of channels. Type Systems are intimately connected to ensuring the well-formedness of programs. In recent years they have been extended with annotations and e ects and are becoming a very popular tool for the analysis of calculi of computations (e.g. 33, 43, 42, 1, 9] ); in our view, type systems are particularly useful when they admit principal types and this is not the case for all of the developments cited.
These approaches are not so dissimilar as might appear at rst sight. In fact, Control Flow Analyses can be expressed in the Constraint Based Formulation used here, in the terminology of Type Systems and using Abstract Interpretation. We refer to 10, 31] and their references for further information about the relationship between these approaches.
We now turn to the second strain of related work. The rst studies in system security reach back to the 1970's and were mainly carried out in the area of operating systems; see the detailed survey by Landwehr 24 The work closest to our proposal in Section 5 is that by Abadi 1] , who studies the secrecy of channels and of encrypted messages, using the spicalculus, an extension of the -calculus devised for writing secure protocols. His is a more ambitious goal than ours, because the spi-calculus also has cryptographic primitives. Semantic correctness of the type system, formalised using testing equivalence, guarantees that there is no leaking of secret information. As for the disciplined use of channels, Abadi's and our aims are very close, as well as for the assumptions made (except that Abadi has a further notion of Any, besides those of Public and Secret). We conjecture that the two approaches are comparable in precision. Indeed our solution ( ; ) can be seen as an explicit type annotation of processes (in the manner of Exercise 5.4 of 31]) and our notion of validation corresponds to validate the type annotation. However, whereas we established that a best solution always exists (via Moore families) and gave a procedure for constructing solutions, 1] does not establish the existence of the analogous notion of principal types, and hence it is unclear whether or not a sound and complete typing algorithm exists. The semantic correctness is checked against two di erent dynamic notions (testing equivalence versus no leaks).
Other interesting papers in this area are 35, 38, 17, 12, 4, 13, 36, 37] . Particularly relevant are Hennessy and Riely's papers 36, 37] that give a type system for D , a variant of the -calculus with explicit sites that harbour mobile processes. A well-typed process correctly uses its capabilities and never compromises the integrity of well-behaved sites. Recently also Cardelli and Gordon 9] propose a type system for the ambient calculus ensuring that a well-typed mobile computation cannot cause certain kinds of run-time faults, even when capabilities can be exchanged between processes.
The idea of static analysis for security has been followed also in the Java world, for example in the Java Bytecode Veri er 25]. Also Abadi faces in 2] the problem of implementing secure systems and proposes to use full abstraction to check that the compiled code enjoys the same security properties of the source program.
The dynamic point of view has been adopted by a certain number of information ow models 19, 26, 27, 16] (to cite only a few). Here, only the external observable behaviour is the object of the analysis. A classical example is the non-interference model of 19, 20] , where the actions of the group of high level users have no e ect on what the group of low level users can observe. McCullough 26, 27] extends this de nition to cope with non determinism. Focardi and Gorrieri 16] use a process algebras setting, by using SPA (Security Process Algebra), an extension of CCS 28] . Our property of no read-up/no write-down could be considered a variant of the non-interference property, studied by most of the authors mentioned above.
Conclusions
We presented a Control Flow Analysis for the -calculus that statically predicts how names will be bound to actual channels at run-time. The only extensions made to the syntax of processes are that a channel is explicitly assigned to a restricted name, and that an input action has the form x(y ), making explicit the rôle of the placeholder y; this change was motivated by the inclusion of -conversion in the semantics. Annotations can be done mechanically, and do not a ect the behaviour of processes; typically, all markers will be di erent. The results of our analysis approximate the actual solutions, because they may give a super-set of the corresponding actual values.
We de ned judgements on solutions and processes, and a set of clauses that operate on judgements so as to validate the correctness of the solution. We proved that a best solution always exists and we also presented a constructive procedure for generating solutions, which is in O(N in Tables 2 and 5 . There, we avoid analysing the \continuation" if the match cannot possibly be passed. Similar considerations could be applied to input and output actions, so as to avoid analysing the \continuation", e.g. in case the empty set is associated with the subject of the action (see 8]).
We described how our analysis can be used to establish two simple properties of security. The rst property we called con nement, the second one discreetness. The two properties are orthogonal, as the rst puts constraints on the communications to the environment, and the second one enforces a discipline on the communications internal to the process under analysis. So, one can separately check them on a process.
An immediate extension to our (two-level) notion of con nement consists of de ning a hierarchy of classi cation levels associated with channels. Equally immediate is extending our analysis in Section 5 to statically check that a high level information is never transmitted on a channel with a lower level of security classi cation.
We did not consider, but we plan to, the more general notion of the no read-up/no write-down property, that assigns levels of con dentiality also to the exchanged data (i.e. the objects of input and output actions). Processes with low level clearance are then not allowed to access (i.e. they can neither send nor receive) highly classi ed data. Note in passing that (an extension of) our rst security property is not enough for getting the full version of the nru/nwd property; indeed, processes with di erent clearances are allowed to send objects with di erent classi cation along the same channel, while this is forbidden in the case considered in Section 5. A further extension to the nru/nwd property might consider to have a partial order of clearance levels (see Chapter 5 of 14]).
Future work will consider calculi more oriented to security. The last two authors have already considered in 32, 21] the ambient calculus 9] that extends the -calculus with an explicit notion of mobility of computation. The main application concerns validating the protectiveness of a rewall, meaning that it does not allow agents to enter unless they know the required passwords. We are also interested in the spi-calculus 3] that enriches the -calculus with primitives for encryption and decryption, and distinguishes between data and channels. The core analysis for the spi-calculus should remain the same as presented here, while some sort of Data Flow Analysis seems necessary to track data manipulations. It would be interesting to study also authentication properties. Preliminary work on a Control Flow
